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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
IRENE ERICKSON, t 
Case No. 
vs. ( 10914 
ORAN L. BEARDALL, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Respondent filed an action against the Appellant 
alleging that pursuant to a divorce between the parties, 
the Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipu-
lation whereby Appellant agreed to pay certain obli-
gations. That Appellant failed to pay said obligations. 
That thereafter, Appellant filed a voluntary petition 
in Bankruptcy. Respondent further alleged that the 
obligations set forth in the stipulation were not dis-
1 
chargeable in bankruptcy as arising out of an alimony 
and maintenance provision of a divorce decree and 
thus not a provable debt in bankruptcy. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court and from a verdict 
and judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in his 
favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1965, the Appellant commenced a pro-
ceeding for divorce against the Respondent. On Sep-
tember 2, 1965, Respondent through counsel informed 
the appellant's counsel of the terms under which a set-
lement of the divorce action could be effected. There-
after in September, 1965 the Appellant and Respond-
ent executed a stipulation wherein Appellant agreed 
to execute a promissory note to the Respondent in the 
amount of $1,265.85 and agreed among other things, 
to pay a joint obligation to First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association in the amount of $1379.83, an obli-
gation owed to Zions First National Bank in the amount 
of $2043.10 and an obligation owed to City Finance 
Company of Murray in the amount of $471.64, and 
2 
T 
I 
( 
I 
I 
to pay Respondent $100.00 per month as alimony until 
her social security was reinstated. 
Thereafter on the 27th day of October, 1965 the 
Court made and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and a Decree awarding the Divorce Decree 
to the Appellant and approving the stipulation of the 
parties regarding alimony and property matters. 
That in July 1966, Appellant was in the process 
of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. That prior 
to such filing the Appellant did transfer to the Re-
spondent a 1964 Dodge Truck in satisfaction of the 
promissory note set forth in the stipulation and ex-
ecuted in the favor of the Respondent in the amount 
of $1265.85. That thereafter on the 28th day of July, 
1966, the Appellant did file a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy and did thereafter discontinue any pay-
ments upon the obligations set forth in the stipulation 
approved by the Court in the Divorce Decree, Civil No. 
28806. 
On August 5, 1966, the Respondent :filed a com-
plaint to collect the amount due under the promissory 
note and praying for judgment against the defendant 
for the amounts owed to First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, City Finance Company of Murray, 
and Zions First National Bank. Appellant filed a 
motion for stay of proceedings asking the Court to 
stay the proceedigs pending the completion of the bank-
ruptcy hearings and the Court granted said stay of 
proceedings on the 20th day of September, 1966 al-
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lowing Respondent 20 days to amend her complaint 
to show an avoidance of discharge in bankruptcy if 
she desired. Thereafter on the 7th of October, 1966, 
Respondent filed her amended complaint alleging that 
the obligations arose out of an alimony and mainten-
ance provision of a Divorce Decree and were not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy and praying for judgment 
against the Appellant for the amounts set forth in the 
complaint. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND 
THE APPLICABLE LAW DOES NOT SUP-
PORT THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT 
THE OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY 
FINANCE COMPANY OF MURRAY, AND 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOR 
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE 
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE N 0 T 
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
POINT II 
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY 
THE RESPONDENT WERE CONTRACTUAL 
IN NATURE AND THE COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLIGA-
4 
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TIONS WERE FOR SUPPORT AND MAIN-
TENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT. THAT 
SUCH OBLIGATIONS WERE DISCHARGED 
BY THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIIE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND 
THE APPLICABLE LAW DOES NOT SUP-
PORT THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT 
THE OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST FEDERAL 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY 
FINANCE COMPANY OF MURRAY, AND 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOH 
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE 
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE N 0 1.' 
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY. 
In asserting her claim against Appellant, Re-
spondent relies upon Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 
Title 11, Bankruptcy, Section 35, U.S.C.A., which 
provides: 
"Debts not effected by a discharge. a. A dis-
charge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt 
from all of his provable debts whether allowable 
in full or in part, except such as (I) . . . ; ( 2) 
. . . or for alimony due or to become due, or for 
maintenance or support of wife or child, ... " 
Thus, the burden of proof upon Respondent was 
to establish proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
5 
that the debts owed to First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, Zions First National Bank and City 
Finance Company of Murray were the obligation of 
the Appellant in order to provide for the support and 
maintenance of the Respondent. 
The record disclosed that at the time of the trial 
the Plaintiff-Respondent had remarried (TR p. 5, lines 
I to 3): 
(Mr. Hinton) "Q You have remarried, have 
you not, since this complaint has been filed?" 
(Irene Erickson) "A Yes. The name is 
Robison." 
It further discloses the purpose of the parties in 
having the Appellant, Mr. Beardall, enter into an 
agreement and stipulation for the payment of certain 
debts to aggregate the amount of funds the Respond-
ent had brought into the marriage. (TR p. 5, lines 19 
through 26): 
(Mr. Hinton) "Q Did you have any funds 
at the time you married Mr. Beardall?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Yes." 
(Mr. Hinton) "Q Can you tell the Court 
how much?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Nearly $5,-
000.00. $4,700.00 and some odd dollars." 
(Mr. Hinton) "Q And did you have any of 
those funds at the time of the divorce?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A No." 
and (TR p. 26, lines 14 to 22): 
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(Mr. Jeffs) "Q Now, if I understood you 
correctly, the purpose of the stipulation and of 
the transfer of these various properties, and of 
Mr. Beardall's assuming the obligations on these 
three debts, was to reimburse you for funds that 
you had at the time that you went into the mar-
riage?" 
(Irene Erickson Ro bison) "A Yes." 
(Mr. Jeffs) "Q To replace or in effect to 
replace the property that you had prior to your 
going into the marriage?" 
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Yes." 
The fact that the assumption of the obligations 
set forth in the stipulation in the divorce proceedings 
which was received as evidence (TR p. 47, lines 25 to 
30 and p. 48, lines l and 2) to reimburse Mrs. Robison 
for funds she had prior to the marriage is further estab-
lished by Mr. Hinton's letter of September 2, 1965 
(Exhibit 5-D) : 
"Mrs. Beardall had in her bank account the 
sum of $4,734.36 at the time of their marriage. 
This has all been spent primarily on Mr. Beard-
all's bills a.vd for automobiles. If we were to fig-
ure interest at four per ce~t on this amount 
without the interest being compounded for the 
seven months in 1963 in which they were married, 
all of 1964 and for the first eight months of this 
year, the total interest would be $426.06. This 
added to the original amount would make $5,-
160.42. 
There are three accounts on which money is 
owed and which Mr. Beardall agreed that he 
should pay. One of these was for siding on the 
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house for $1,379.83, for the 1965 Valiant auto-
mobile, $2,043.10 and $471.64 to City Finance. 
This amount totals to $3,894.57. If that figure 
is subtracted from the total amount she should 
have coming, it would leave a balance of $1,-
265.85." 
The promissory note in the sum of $1,265.85 (Ex-
hibit 4-P) was executed to make up the difference be-
tween the sum of the three obligations assumed by Mr. 
Beardall and the amount claimed by Mrs. Robison 
together with interest as necessary to reimburse her for 
the funds brought to the marriage. 
Respondent claims the assumption of these debts 
was for her support and maintenance. However, the 
court will note from an examination of the file in the 
divorce proceeding that the divorce was granted to 
Appellant herein. Under such circumstance, the court 
in the divorce matter would not be obliged to provide 
for the support of the offending party. In this divorce 
the parties resolved that matter by providing in their 
stipulation and agreement that Mr. Beardall should 
pay Mrs. Robison $100.00 per month until her social 
security was reinstated, which he did. (TR p. 16, lines 
17 to 20 and p. 28, lines 17 to 23). 
The dischargeability of debts and obligations of 
parties to a divorce under a property settlement agree-
ment or a support and maintenance agreement is dis-
cussed by various texts and treatises as well as in the 
case law. 
An annotation in 104 A.L.R. at p. 722 collects 
8 
and groups the cases construing and applying the pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act excepting debts for 
maintenance or support of wife and child from dis-
charge. Therein the annotator cites several cases hold-
ing that agreements entered into prior to divorce where-
in the husband agrees to pay payments to the wife 
which will continue after the divorce are held to be 
support matters and not dischargeable under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. However, the annotator goes on to say 
at page 724: 
"The exception of the Bankruptcy Act under 
consideration does not, however, extend to all 
claims for maintenance or support." 
Under this portion of the annotation the annotator is 
quoted as follows: 
"In Re Ostrander ( 1905; D. C.) 139 F. 592, 
Am. Bankr. Rep. 96, it was held that the pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act exempting from 
discharge liabilities for maintenance or support 
of wife or child did not include a debt incurred 
by the husband for the services of a physician to 
attend the wife while she was in a normal rela-
tionship to her husband. The court said: "If so, 
a person supplying goods for a wife or child, 
or rendering a service necessary for support or 
maintenance, at the request of the husband, 
without delinquency on his part, would be be-
yond the scope of the act. The grocer, the mar-
ketman, clothiers of all descripton, physicians, 
dentists,-in fact all who, by service or sale, con-
tribute to the support of the family and whereby 
to the support of a wife or child,-would have 
claims not dischargeable under the act." 
9 
"In Loman v. Locke (1921) 240 Mass. 551, 
134 N.E. 343, 48 Am. Bankr. Rep. 198, it was 
held that a judgment for board, clothing, and 
!medicine furnished the defendant's wife and 
child was a claim provable in bankruptcy, and 
not within the provision of the Bankruptcy Act 
exempting from the effect of discharge liabili-
ties for maintenance and support of life and 
minor children." 
"In Schellenberg v. :Mullaney (1906) 112 
App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432, 16 Am. Bankr. 
Rep. 542, it was held that § 17 of the Act of 
1905, excepting "liabilities for alimony due to 
or to become due or for maintenance or support 
of wife and child" from discharge, referred only 
to the involuntary liability under the common 
law for support of wife and children, and to any-
one who relieved their wants, but that it did not 
refer to liability for goods purchased by a hus-
band or parent and used by wife or child, and 
that a debt for such goods was discharged by a 
discharge in bankruptcy." 
In the comprehensive 10 volume work Collier on 
Bankruptcy, 14th Edition, Volume 1, page 1646, the 
particular matters involved in the case now before the 
court have been discussed: 
"The above quoted portion of clause (2) ap-
plies to the common law liability involuntarily 
imposed upon the parent for support of wife 
or childY' · 
"It was intended to include liability where a 
parent had failed or ref used to make a provision 
for maintenance and such was furnished by an-
other.4" 
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"It does not include contracted liabilities for 
goods purchased (although these be necessa-
ries) 5 medical attendance furnished,6 or board 
supplied7 by a parent for the use and benefit of 
the wife or child.B" 
Also in the more recent publication of Collier 
Bankruptcy Manual, 2nd Edition, under Section 17, 
page 212: 
"With respect to maintenance or support, the 
statute applies to the common-law liability in-
voluntarily imposed upon the parent for the sup-
port of wife or child. "It was intended to include 
liability where a parent had failed or refused 
to make provision for maintenance and such was 
furnished by another."4 It does not include con-
tracted liabilities for goods purchased (although 
these be necessaries), medical attendance fur-
nished, or board supplied, by a parent for the 
use and benefit of the wife or child.5" 
This is further corroborated in 9 Am Jur 2d 793: 
"It must be observed that this statutory ex-
ception to operation of a discharge applies only 
to direct liabilities based upon, or substituted 
for, legal support obligations. It does not refer 
to, or include, liability for goods purchased by 
a husband or parent and used by the wife or 
child, and such liabilities remain dischargeable 
in the bankruptcy of the husband or parent.3 .. " 
"In a number of cases it has been held or rec-
ognized that a property settlement agreement 
between spouses is dischargeable in bankruptcy, 
at least where it is truly or substantially a prop-
erty settlement agreement, and not an agree-
ment for alimony, support, or maintenance.5" 
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Many of the cases dealing with the question are not 
in point. The principal case relied upon at trial by 
Plaintiff-Respondent is Lyon vs. Lyon ( 1949) 115 Utah 
466, 206 P.2d 148. 
"That testimony was to the effect that prior 
to the divorce the parties had jointly owned an 
equity in a home in Indiana, but before the di-
vorce that home was placed in the wife's name 
alone; that at the time the written stipulation 
was signed; it was understood between the par-
ties that the $5,000 was for her support and main-
tenance, and the payments on the house mort-
gage were for the same purpose, and that the 
insurance was to assure her at least $5,000 for 
the same purpose ... All obligations "for main-
tenance or support of wife or child," whether 
denominated alimony by the state statute or 
note, are such as are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. It follows, therefore, that the real issue 
in this case is not, as the parties have argued, 
whether the award of the divorce decree was 
alimony or a property settlement, but rather 
whether the "property settlement" was really 
an award for the support and maintenance of 
the defendant's wife ... Thus, looking behind 
the decree and the stipulation, the conclusion 
seems inescapable under the authorities cited 
that much of the property awarded, without re-
gard to the order for payment of the mortgage 
upon the home, or the judgment for $5000, or 
the order for maintenance of the insurance pro-
tection, was 'in the nature of alimony,' and de-
signed and contemplated by the parties to be 
for the support and maintenance of the plain-
tiff. 
"Such a conclusion is further supported by 
12 
consideration of the years that the parties main-
tained the domestic relationship, by the fact that 
she was a stenographer and self-sustaining be-
fore marriage, that she is now 56 years old and 
thus practically unemployable in her profession, 
and by her positive testimony that in the attor-
ney's office at the time of drawing the stipula-
tion the payments of money were referred to as 
being for her support and maintenance, and by 
the defendant's admission that support and 
ma,intenance of th plaintiff was discussed there." 
... The fact that the husband was to pay off 
the mortgage on the home, that he was to pay 
the alimony in gross in monthly installments of 
$50, that he was to carry insurance on his own 
life with his former wife as beneficiary, and 
that she received nearly all of the household 
furniture, all point to the idea of support. The 
evidence adequately supports the findings and 
holdings of the trial court . . . 
The court in this case relied heavily upon the fact 
that there had been 22 years of marriage, that the award 
was made to pay $5,000 in installments directly to the 
wife, that life insurance was to be carried on the life 
of the defendant with the plaintiff as beneficiary and 
the award of 15/16ths of the property directly to the 
plaintiff wife. 
The present case can be distinguished from the 
Lyon case on numerous grounds. 
(a) Divorce granted to Appellant against the Re-
spondent imposing no automatic legal duty of support, 
(b) Marriage for just over two years, 
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( c) Testimony of Respondent that payments were 
to reimburse her for funds she had at the time of mar-
riage (TR p. 26 ( lines 14 to 22), 
( d) Payments to be made to creditors not to Re-
spondent, 
( e) Was not a payment for support, but agree-
ment to hold harmless, 
( f) The nature of the obligations; siding, (TR p. 
23, lines 19 to 28) , Encyclopedia and color television 
(TR p. 24, lines 20 to 28) , and an automobile (TR 
p. 25, lines 20 to 28). 
Since Respondent has claimed that these obliga-
tions were to reimburse her for funds brought into the 
marriage and loaned to or used in behalf of Appellant, 
the 1950 cases of LaRue vs. LaRue, 341 Ill. App. 411, 
93 N.E.2d 823, is almost directly in point. Sarah 
LaRue brought a proceeding for a rule to show cause 
why William LaRue should not be punished for con-
tempt of Court in neglecting and refusing to comply 
with an order in a divorce decree to pay plaintiff an 
amount loaned by her to defendant. The trial court 
found the defendant guilty in contempt and committed 
him to jail until he purged himself thereof. The appeal 
court reversed, saying: 
"It is well settled that upon adjudication in 
bankruptcy, title to all the bankrupt's property 
vests in the trustee in bankruptcy as of the date 
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and the 
bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction, pas-
14 
session and control of the estate of the bank-
rupt which cannot be affected by proceedings in 
the State Court ... Furthermore, where the 
jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court has inter-
vened, no state court can proceed with a pend-
ing suit to recover a dischargeable debt except 
by permission of the bankruptcy court .... 
Ordinary money payments directed to be made 
by judgments or decrees are civil debts and 
dischargeable in bankruptcy ... A decree for 
alimony is not an ordinary money decree and is 
not regarded as a debt owing from a husband 
to his wife, but rests on the natural and legal 
duty. of the husband to support his wife and is 
not discharged by an order of the bankruptcy 
court ... In the instant case, the original divorce 
decree found that appellant was indebted to 
appellee for $1300 for money loaned by appellee 
to appellant and ordered appellant to pay that 
sum to appellee and created a lien upon any 
real estate owned by appellant within this State 
and directed a money judgment to be entered 
for that amount. The J:!.ayment so directed was 
for money loaned and did not arise as a result 
of the marital relation of the parties. The obli-
gation was a civil debt and not alimony and was 
dischaI'geable in bankruptcy . . . Inasmuch, 
however, as appellant had been adjudicated a 
bankrupt prior to the time the instant petition 
seeking to adjudge him in contempt was filed, 
the contempt order issued by the City Court 
was not proper. The order appealed from is 
therefore reversed. 
The Lyon case was decided in 1949 and thereafter 
this court was faced with the more specific question in-
rnlved in the case now before the court, that is, whether 
15 
the decree of a trial court ordering the husband to pay 
obligations incurred during marriage is dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. 
~.Y:Z Fife vs. Fife (1954) 1 Utah 2nd 281, 265 P.2d 
'Gal, wherein the court said, 
"The parties married in 1944 during the in-
terlocutory period of defendant's previous di-
vorce. Early in 1952, plaintiff was granted an 
annulment of the marriage and was awarded 
certain jointly-acquired property. At the same 
time, defendant was ordered to pay designated 
creditors having claims against the property. 
He failed to pay and was cited to show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt. On the 
day before hearing, he filed bankruptcy sched-
ules, listing, among other, the debts he had been 
ordered to pay. Next day he was adjudicated a 
bankrupt and made proof of such fact by cer-
tificate. Six months later on plaintiff's petition 
which prayed only punishment for contempt, 
he was again cited. He was not found in con-
tempt, but the court entered judgment against 
him and in favor of the plaintiff for the amount 
she had been forced to pay the creditors in the 
meantime." 
"Defendant contends that his adjudication 
gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over his 
assets and liabilities; that any claim by plain-
tiff necessarily was adjudicable there, and that 
the state court had no authority to enter the 
judgment, subject to this appeal. Plaintiff rea-
sons otherwise, urging that to deny such author-
ity would emasculate a state court's power to 
grant equitable relief simply by seeking sanc-
tuary in bankruptcy; . . . It follows, and we 
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hold, that the judgment entered after the ad-
judication evidenced a provable claim in bank-
ruptcy,3 that it was "in esse" prior to the ad-
judication, not within the "exception to dis-
charge" language of Sec. 17 of the Act, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 35,4 and not a claim of such nature 
as not to be provable in bankruptcy,5 and con-
sequently the state court was without authority 
to enter such judgment ... Without deciding 
the point, we can say that bankrupts frequently 
and generally are relieved of obligations im-
posed by state courts ... Plaintiff had a remedy, 
for what it might be worth, by resort to de-
fendant's assets in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
along with other creditors. To declare a pref er-
ence for her under the facts of this case, where 
a judgment came after, instead of before, and 
when it could have come before, instead of 
after the adjudication, - when it would have 
b~en dischargeable, - would seem unrealistic, 
unfair and circumventive of the unburdening 
purpose of the bankruptcy act." 
The court held that the obligation to pay creditors 
was dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
The annotation in 74 ALR 2d 758 reviews the dis-
chargeability of property settlement agreements be-
tween spouses. It sets forth the general rule that prop-
erty settlement agreements are dischargeable unless 
such agreement is held to be in the nature of support 
as in the Lyon case. 
Cited therein in support of the general rule is 
Tropp vs. Tropp (1933) 129 Ca. App. 62, 18 P.2d 
385, wherein a case similar to the case now before the 
17 
court, an agreement was entered into for the payment 
of $250.00 per month for support and maintenance 
until remarriage and a $50,000.00 property settlement 
to be made in monthly payments. The court held that 
though the support payments were non dischargeable 
in bankruptcy, the $50,000.00 payment constituted a 
debt incurred in effecting a property settlement and ' 
was dischargeable. '!'his is to be analogized to the 
case now before the court where support payments were 
established by the agreement of the parties at $100.00 
per month pending the reinstatement of social security 
payments and the obligation of the payment of the 
three named creditors was to reimburse the Defendant-
Respondent for money she brought into the marriage. 
Also in Goggans vs. Osborn (1956, CA9 Alaska) 
237 F2d 186, where the court held a property settle-
ment dischargeable in bankruptcy, and the principal 
case on which the annotation is founded, Smalley vs. 
Smalley (1959) 176 Cal App 2d (Adv 402), 1 Cal 
Rptr 440, 74 ALR 2d 756, wherein the court held that 
the parties agreement to settle property rights in lieu 
of alimony, and where alimony had been waived in 
consideration of the agreement for the property settle-
ment was nevertheless dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
Also the annotator draws reference to Fernandes 
vs. Pitta (1941) 47 Cal App. 2d 248, 117 P.2d 728, 
where a wife had obtained a judgment on four unpaid 
notes and the court therein said that though the subject 
of maintenance and support was incidentally mentioned 
in the contract, that the notes were given for the pur-
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pose of settling the rights of property and support 
between the parties and were held to be dischargeable 
in bankruptcy, distinguishing the case of Remondino 
vs. Remondino case cited for the proposition that certain 
support obligations are not dischargeable. 
Attention is also drawn to the case Stoutenberg 
vs. Stoutenberg, 285 Mich. 505, 281 N.W. 305, wherein 
a decree ordering the husband to clear the obligation 
on the mortgage on a home was held to be dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff-Respondent that 
the obligations assumed were to provide reimbursement 
to her of funds held prior to marriage, the nature of 
the particular debts involved, and the fact that the 
divorce was awarded to the Appellant hereunder, 
viewed in the light of the case and textual citations set 
forth herein all amply demonstrate that the payments 
were not for the support and maintenance of the Re-
spondent and was a dischargeable debt under the Bank-
rupcty Act. 
POINT II 
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY 
THE RESPONDENT 'VERE CONTRACTUAL 
IN NATURE AND THE COURT ERRED 
\VHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLIGA~ 
TIONS WERE FOR SUPPORT AND MAIN-
TENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT. THAT 
SUCH OBLIGATIONS WERE DISCHARGED 
BY THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS. 
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Examination of the file in Civil X o. 28806 received 
in evidence (TR 47, lines 25 to 30 and p. 48 lines 1 
and 2) discloses that your Appellant herein was award-
ed the decree of diYorce from Respondent. The Court 
founded the grounds upon cruelty of the Respondent. 
The court then found the stipulation of the parties to 
be reasonable and approved the same. The court did not 
make an order with respect to the matters set forth in 
the stipulation but merely approved it. 
It is also drawn to the court's attention that this 
action was not brought under the contempt powers of 
the court in the diYorce matter but was commenced 
as a separate matter pleading the stipulation and agree-
ment of the parties and asking for a money judgment. 
The Respondent herself by her proceeding considered 
this to be in the nature of a contractual obligation. 
A similar circumstance was presented to the court 
in Wintrode t·s. Connors ( 1941) 67 Ohio App. 106, 46 
Am. B.R. (N.S.) 751, 35 X.E. 2d 1018. 
This was an action founded on a contract between 
the plaintiff and the defendant whereby the plaintiff 
agreed to furnish support and care for the minor child 
of the defendant at the rate of $1.00 per day. There-
after, defendant filed a >oluntary petition in bank· 
ruptcy and plaintiff brought suit upon the claim. In 
handing down its ruling the court said at page 1020: 
·• ( 1) It is significant that since the amend-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1903. the courts 
have, without deYiation or dissent. interpreted 
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that part of the section referred to in this case 
as including only such liability as is imposed by 
law and not such as is created by contract. In 
this we think the legislative intent and purpose 
in passing the amendment has been correctly 
interpreted. Contract liabilities have always 
been discharged in bankruptcy, while it has al-
ways been the policy of the Bankruptcy Act 
to refuse the right of discharge from debts cre-
ated through certain actionable wrongs." 
The court thereupon went on to rule that the 
finding of the lower court that the debt upon which 
the action was founded in the case before the court 
was discharged in bankruptcy was correct as being 
founded upon the contractual agreement of the parties. 
The question here is not whether Appellant has 
complied with an order of the equity court in the divorce 
matter, but whether his agreement entered into in con-
junction with a divorce proceeding is dischargeable 
under the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Under the discretionary powers of the equity court, 
where as here the Decree of Divorce was awarded to 
Appellant upon a finding against the Respondent, the 
court was not obliged to make any award for support. 
The stipulation was a contractual agreement be-
tween the parties. It recited that the Appellant would 
pay the obligation to First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association for siding placed upon the residence of 
Respondent (TR p. 23), lines 19 to 28): the obligation 
to City Finance Company of Murray, for an encyclo-
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pedia and color television (TR p. 24, lines 20 to 28) ; 
and the obligation to Zions First National Bank on 
a Valiant automobile (TR p. 25, lines 20 to 28) all 
for items not in the nature of support, but only as tes-
tified to by Respondent and as itemized in the letter 
of September 2, 1965 (Exhibit 5-D) for reimburse-
ment of funds of the Respondent prior to her marriage 
to Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant asserts to the court that in the circum-
stances presented by this case, i.e., a divorce granted 
to the husband, agreement and stipulation of the parties 
that the husband will pay certain obligations to creditors 
as a return of funds the wife brought to the marriage, 
stipulation providing for payment of support of $100.00 
per month until reinstatement of social security, only 
two years of marriage, and the nature of the obligations 
assumed by the husband; the claim of the wife was a 
debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. Appellant respect-
fully urges that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
For JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
227 North University 
Provo, Utah 
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